The failure of the "War on Terrorism" and the Middle East crisis
The invasion of Iraq (2003) had several justifications, according to the reasons invoked by the Bush Administration. One of those, the possession of “arms of mass destruction” by Iraq’s dictatorial regime, putting at risk the safety of the West, proved to be totally false and represented, since the beginning, a serious setback for the credibility and consistency of the American strategy for the Middle East. But such invasion was also part of the so-called “global war on terrorism”. Firstly, because of the supposed connections between Sadam’s regime and Al Qaeda; and then, because it was hoped that the fall of Iraq’s dictatorship and the subsequent democratic regime to be installed, would have had a “contagious effect” in the Middle East region and would then help to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As everyone can see…
The strategy associated to the “global war on terrorism” had several components. On one hand, the fight against terrorism was conceived as a “war” and, therefore, the focus put on the use of military means as the most efficient way to defeat the terrorists. Such strategy (hard power), immediately managed to alienate the huge wave of solidarity that Americans had known after the September 11th, 2001 attacks. Remember not only the hesitations of the governments of many allies’ countries on the militarist strategy, but also the huge popular demonstrations opposing the war on Iraq on February 15th, 2003, especially, but not only, in Europe. On the other hand, these hesitations of the allies on the strategy focused on the hard power and the difficulties of the Americans in framing it within international legality are at the origin of the second fundamental component of this “global war on terrorism”: the unilateralism.
In After the Neocons – America at the Crossroads (2006), one famous American neoconservative, Fukuyama, not only recognises the failure of Washington’s hard power strategy, but also declares his desertion from the neoconservative movement, namely because of its support of such options in terms of external policy. Otherwise, President Bush himself recognised (at least implicitly) the failure of his options and, more recently, moved away from them and tried to give more focus to the use of the soft power and multilateralism.
This is all because of the recent violence escalade in the Middle East. Reacting to the capture of one of its soldiers in the Gaza border by Hamas’ activists one month ago and, two weeks later, of two other soldiers in the Lebanese border (by the Hezbollah fundamentalists), Israel started two war offensives not only against those movements, but also against Gaza and the Lebanon as a whole, randomly attacking governmental institutions, civil and military infra-structures, civil settlements and military forces. The Israeli leaders have been trying to present the provocations and the attacks on Israel as being part of one more strategy of the “axis of evil” (nowadays composed by Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah) in its war against the West. Therefore, we are again at the “global war on terrorism”, now starred by Israel, with American support.
On one hand, internally, it is basically with Israel that the West shares democratic values, the same concept of human rights and common guidelines in terms of liberalisation of habits and traditions. Moreover, we can’t help recognising its right to respond to provocations and attacks from its neighbours. On the other hand, we also have to condemn the brutal and disproportional reaction by which Israel is punishing the entire populations of Gaza and Lebanon. Otherwise, with these kinds of reactions, how can we distinguish the Israeli democracy from any barbarian dictatorship? Where does the supposed moral supremacy of democracies, so dear to the neoconservatives, lay? Past and forgotten seem to be the times of contained reactions of Rabin’s government to the continued provocations suffered, even after the Oslo agreements…
The same way that the Bush Administration’s militarist options completely failed, it is also very likely that the Israeli strategy won’t be the best way to solve the problems. On one hand, it deepens the Arab humiliation and gives more ground to some of the arguments often invoked by the fundamentalists in their crusade against the West. On the other hand, it alienates the needed support from the moderates to any Israeli-Arab agreements. But, are Israeli authorities worried at all? It is hard to believe that, since the democratic election of Hamas as the new major party ay the Parliament in Gaza, all the Israeli efforts were put in trying to isolate the movement and almost anything has been done to empower the moderates and to create the conditions for the recognition of Israel. And it is also hard to understand, unless it is seen as part of an already existing strategy, that, when the Palestinian President Abbas was trying, with the support of the Hamas, to organise a referendum which would implicitly recognise the State of Israel, the reaction of Israel to the capture of its soldier in the Gaza border has been so brutally violent.
The strategy associated to the “global war on terrorism” had several components. On one hand, the fight against terrorism was conceived as a “war” and, therefore, the focus put on the use of military means as the most efficient way to defeat the terrorists. Such strategy (hard power), immediately managed to alienate the huge wave of solidarity that Americans had known after the September 11th, 2001 attacks. Remember not only the hesitations of the governments of many allies’ countries on the militarist strategy, but also the huge popular demonstrations opposing the war on Iraq on February 15th, 2003, especially, but not only, in Europe. On the other hand, these hesitations of the allies on the strategy focused on the hard power and the difficulties of the Americans in framing it within international legality are at the origin of the second fundamental component of this “global war on terrorism”: the unilateralism.
In After the Neocons – America at the Crossroads (2006), one famous American neoconservative, Fukuyama, not only recognises the failure of Washington’s hard power strategy, but also declares his desertion from the neoconservative movement, namely because of its support of such options in terms of external policy. Otherwise, President Bush himself recognised (at least implicitly) the failure of his options and, more recently, moved away from them and tried to give more focus to the use of the soft power and multilateralism.
This is all because of the recent violence escalade in the Middle East. Reacting to the capture of one of its soldiers in the Gaza border by Hamas’ activists one month ago and, two weeks later, of two other soldiers in the Lebanese border (by the Hezbollah fundamentalists), Israel started two war offensives not only against those movements, but also against Gaza and the Lebanon as a whole, randomly attacking governmental institutions, civil and military infra-structures, civil settlements and military forces. The Israeli leaders have been trying to present the provocations and the attacks on Israel as being part of one more strategy of the “axis of evil” (nowadays composed by Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah) in its war against the West. Therefore, we are again at the “global war on terrorism”, now starred by Israel, with American support.
On one hand, internally, it is basically with Israel that the West shares democratic values, the same concept of human rights and common guidelines in terms of liberalisation of habits and traditions. Moreover, we can’t help recognising its right to respond to provocations and attacks from its neighbours. On the other hand, we also have to condemn the brutal and disproportional reaction by which Israel is punishing the entire populations of Gaza and Lebanon. Otherwise, with these kinds of reactions, how can we distinguish the Israeli democracy from any barbarian dictatorship? Where does the supposed moral supremacy of democracies, so dear to the neoconservatives, lay? Past and forgotten seem to be the times of contained reactions of Rabin’s government to the continued provocations suffered, even after the Oslo agreements…
The same way that the Bush Administration’s militarist options completely failed, it is also very likely that the Israeli strategy won’t be the best way to solve the problems. On one hand, it deepens the Arab humiliation and gives more ground to some of the arguments often invoked by the fundamentalists in their crusade against the West. On the other hand, it alienates the needed support from the moderates to any Israeli-Arab agreements. But, are Israeli authorities worried at all? It is hard to believe that, since the democratic election of Hamas as the new major party ay the Parliament in Gaza, all the Israeli efforts were put in trying to isolate the movement and almost anything has been done to empower the moderates and to create the conditions for the recognition of Israel. And it is also hard to understand, unless it is seen as part of an already existing strategy, that, when the Palestinian President Abbas was trying, with the support of the Hamas, to organise a referendum which would implicitly recognise the State of Israel, the reaction of Israel to the capture of its soldier in the Gaza border has been so brutally violent.
*Text written by my fomer Political Sciences teacher, André Freire, published last Monday on Público. I am the one to blame for the poor translation into English...
posted by Diogo at 2:53 PM
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